

**00925**

**1962/10/31**

**EYES ONLY**  
**INCOMING TELEGRAM**

*Department of State*

*U H 31*  
*1. Dungan*  
*2. Return*

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Action  
**SS**

Control: 20945  
Rec'd: October 31, 1962  
11:21 p.m.

Info

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 915, October 31, 7 p.m.

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**FILE**

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**PRIORITY**

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Department telegram 909

Hermes Lima informed me Wednesday afternoon that Goulart had received in morning a sealed letter from General Albino reporting Albino's conversation with Fidel Castro Monday. Goulart had taken letter to Brasilia, but Hermes had full notes from which he read.

In reponse Albino's presentation Brazilian views, Fidel said admitted that Soviet declaration on base withdrawals was first USSR decision on any Cuban-Soviet matter taken without previous notice to Cubans.

Albino went on to say GOB saw three essential conditions to passing through crisis in Cuban relations with rest of hemisphere and normalizing them: (A) Demilitarization in sense of destruction of types of offensive weapons, bases, et cetera, which might be base Cuban armed attack on neighbors; (B) agreement to stop receiving arms which might accumulate war materiel exceeding needs for Cuban defense; (C) abstention by Cuba from acting as base for ideological aggression through export of propaganda, funds, et cetera.

Fidel listened to this with close attention and a certain degree of receptivity.

Albino

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Guidelines
By <u>MMK</u> NARA, Date <u>10/2/96</u>

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-2- 915, October 31, 7 p.m. from Rio de Janeiro

Albino then said that demilitarization would require international inspection. This idea was repudiated vehemently by Fidel as constituting an insult to the pride of the Cuban people. Albino then replied that such inspection could perhaps extend not only to Cuba, but also to other Caribbean countries to insure that they too were not engaged in war like preparations including training Cuban exiles with view to invasion of Cuba. This modified idea of inspection was received much more sympathetically by Fidel.

Fidel then stated that it would be a condition of success in any set of negotiations for normalizing Cuban relations with hemisphere that Guantanamo be evacuated, arguing that US no longer has real military use for base and that insisting on its retention is humiliating for Cubans.

Conversation closed by Fidel's stating he understood Brazilian position, welcomed its presentation and heard explanation with great interest. Albino is to see Fidel again before departure, probably Wednesday, but Hermes not clear whether talk substantive or merely formal.

Hermes also mentioned that in telephone talk with Goulart today, Ambassador Bastain Pinto stated that Cuban popular support for Fidel and government apparently remains massive.

I undertook to report promptly. Also remarked that, while not pretending military expertise I had impression Guantanamo much more important militarily than Fidel suggested, especially for anti-submarine operations. Politically, I said, injection Guantanamo into discussions at this time would rule out any serious negotiation. Hermes said he recognized political sensitivity in US, thought that perhaps it might be negotiated some time in wider context regional or global disarmament discussions, but predicted that it was bound to be source continuing friction however Cuban policies might evolve.

GORDON

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